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INTRODUCTION

T is often remarked that the United States does not have an actual
health care "system," but rather a patchwork of financing and delivery systems more remarkable for their lack of real coordination than
anything else. Similarly, health law cannot help but resemble this nonsystem for which it provides the infrastructure. With the passing of another year, Texas has again expanded the practice of health law by adding
to the patchwork of new legal considerations that the health care industry
must track and manage. This article presents the key health law developments from the Survey period under four topic areas: physician and facility liability; contractual obligations; government investigations and
enforcement; and public health and indigent care.
II.

PHYSICIAN AND FACILITY LIABILITY

With respect to the liability of health providers, there were four key
cases from the Texas Supreme Court and one from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The opinion in the federal casein which the appellate court reversed an infamous multimillion-dollar
verdict against a hospital and the physicians who temporarily restricted
another physician's privileges during a peer-review investigation-may

prove to have the greatest impact of the five cases discussed in this
section.
A.

GROSS

NEGLIGENCE IN HOSPITAL OUTSOURCING

In Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the Dallas Court of Appeals' holding that a hospital was grossly negligent in the death of a man who was presented to
the hospital in the morning with difficultly breathing and died later that
night due to an acute mitral valve leakage.1 After initially arriving at the
hospital, the treating physician ordered a "stat" echocardiogram (echo)
for the patient. 2 The mitral valve problem was identified as soon as the
1. 271 S.W.3d 238, 243-45 (Tex. 2008).
2. Id. at 244.
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echo was completed. 3 However, it was not completed until almost three
hours after it was ordered, and the patient died shortly thereafter. 4 Unbeknownst to the physician; the hospital, Columbia Medical Center of
Las Colinas, had outsourced its echo services and had elected by contract
not to pay an additional fee for guaranteed echo response times in emer5
gency situations.
Ultimately, the supreme court found that Columbia's conduct deviated
so far from the standard of care as to create an extreme risk of harm, and
that Columbia was subjectively aware of, but consciously indifferent to,
this risk because Columbia: "[(1)] had actual knowledge of the necessity
for emergency echo services . . . [(2)] declined to make such services
available, and [(3)] failed to communicate the limitation on its echo services to its physicians or nursing staff."'6 Columbia argued that it could
not be held grossly negligent because echo services were not required
hospital services. 7 The supreme court explained that this argument was
irrelevant because the hospital chose to provide such services. 8 The supreme court further explained that the physician could have referred the
patient to a facility with capability to provide the echo in a timely manner
if he had known that Columbia did not have such capabilities. 9 The majority opinion of the supreme court upheld the jury's findings of gross
negligence despite the dissenting opinion of Justices Green and Hecht,
who argued there was no evidence that Columbia recognized, at the time
it was negotiating the echo services contract, that the lack of a guaranteed
response time "would pose an extreme risk of harm to its patients." 10
As outsourcing contracts become more common, they inherently introduce novel liability risks. The opinion in Hogue demonstrates the supreme court's concern over outsourcing arrangements for hospital
services through its insistence that the ultimate responsibility of patient
care at the hospital remains with the hospital, regardless of outsourcing.
B.

PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE IN SUICIDE CASES

In Providence Health Center v. Dowell, a divided Texas Supreme Court
addressed the causation parameters of hospital and physician liability
when a patient commits suicide shortly after an emergency room visit for
an attempted suicide.11 The parents of the deceased patient, the Dowells,
brought a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, the
hospital's psychiatric treatment center, and the emergency room physi3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 245.

Id. at

244-45.

Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 250, 253.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 257, 259 (Green, J., dissenting).
262 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. 2008).
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cian who saw the patient. 12 The Dowells argued that the physician's brief
interaction with the patient fell below the standard of care because the
physician did not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the patient's
3
suicide risk before allowing the patient to be released from the hospital.'
The Waco Court of Appeals agreed with the Dowells and affirmed the
jury's finding that the hospital and the psychiatric center were both liable
for forty percent of the damages, and that the physician was liable for the
14
remaining twenty percent.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision and disagreed with the Dowells' argument that the health care providers' incomplete suicide assessment and failure to hospitalize the patient were the
proximate cause of the patient's subsequent death. 15 The supreme court
explained that even if the health care providers were negligent, "their
negligence was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of [the patient's] death a day and a half later" because "the defendants' negligence
was too attenuated from the suicide to have been a substantial factor in
bringing it about."'16 The supreme court listed the following facts in support of its conclusion: (1) the patient likely would not have consented to
hospitalization even if a more thorough assessment had been performed,
(2) there was no evidence that the patient could have been involuntarily
hospitalized, (3) there was no evidence that hospitalization would have
prevented the suicide, and (4) the time and intervening events between
the release and the suicide were too remote. 17 As described by the supreme court, "[the patient's] inability to cope with personal crises led to
his death,"' 8 not the health care providers' negligence.
Justice Wainwright concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed
with the majority's decision to reverse the appellate court's judgment but
preferred remanding the case for a new trial because the jury did not
address the question of the patient's proportionate liability.' 9 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice O'Neil, and joined by Justices Jefferson and Medina, expressed concern over the majority's creation of "new
legal hurdles that are insurmountable" and the implication that "suicide
is simply not preventable. ' 20 The majority rebutted these assertions by
stating, "[tihe dissent seems to imply that a health care provider who is
negligent in treating a patient's mental health is liable regardless of
whether the negligence caused a subsequent suicide, thereby becoming in
'21
effect an insurer of the patient's conduct, whatever it might be."
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

327.
328.
327-28.
325.
328, 330.
328-30.
329.
330-32 (Wainright, J., concurring).
333, 336 (Oneill, J., dissenting).
330.
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In essence, the opinion in Providencerequires plaintiffs in suicide cases
to prove that the health care provider's failure to perform an act required
by the standard of care was a substantial factor in causing the subsequent
suicide. In assessing substantiality, Texas courts ask whether the suicide
would still have occurred even if the health care provider had performed
the expected act. If the answer is "likely not," then the plaintiff will have
successfully proven the causation element, but if the answer is "likely
yes," then the plaintiff's claim will fail.
C.

INADEQUATE EXPERT REPORTS

In Lewis v. Funderburk22 and Leland v. Brandal,23 the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed statutory procedure issues related to inadequate expert
reports in medical malpractice cases governed by section 74.351 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 24 In Funderburk, the supreme
court resolved a split among the appellate courts regarding appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of expert reports governed by the
statute. 2 5 The dispute in Funderburk arose when the defendant, Dr.
26
Lewis, allegedly provided negligent treatment of a child's broken wrist.
The supreme court was asked to review the Waco Court of Appeals' refusal, for want of jurisdiction, of Dr. Lewis' interlocutory appeal of a denied motion to dismiss due to an inadequate expert report. 27 At the time
of the decision, the majority of Texas appellate courts had held that they
had jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of this nature because the statutory provision allowing interlocutory appeals when the plaintiff does not
in which the
file an expert report implicitly also applies to situations
28
plaintiff files an allegedly inadequate expert report.
The supreme court agreed with the majority of the appeals courts and
reversed the Waco Court of Appeals. 29 The supreme court explained that
the Texas Legislature intended the interlocutory appeal option to apply
to inadequate reports, though not explicitly stated in section 74.351, because another provision in the statute, section 74.351(c), specifies that a
plaintiff will be held to have not filed an expert report under the statute 30if
the plaintiff files a report that is later determined to be inadequate.
Thus, the supreme court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
appeal of the trial court's denial of Dr. Lewis'
consider the interlocutory
31
motion to dismiss.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

253 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2008).
257 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2008).
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
Funderburk,253 S.W.3d at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
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In another dispute over an inadequate expert report, the supreme court
in Leland interpreted a provision of the medical malpractice statute that
addresses court discretion in granting extensions to cure inadequate reports. 32 The dispute arose when the defendant, Dr. Leland, allegedly
caused the plaintiff's stroke, resulting in paralysis and inability to speak,
by ordering the patient to stop taking his anticoagulant medication prior
to a dental procedure. 33 When the plaintiff filed suit, Dr. Leland argued
that the plaintiff's expert report was inadequate under the statute. 34 The
trial court disagreed, and Dr. Leland filed an interlocutory appeal of the
decision to the San Antonio Court of Appeals. 35 The court of appeals
agreed with Dr. Leland, but gave the trial court the discretion to allow
the plaintiff a thirty-day window to correct the inadequate expert report.36 Dr. Leland then appealed to the supreme court, arguing that the
thirty-day extension at section 74.351(c) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code only applies to trial court determinations of report inadequacy, not appellate-level determinations. 37 The statutory provision in
question permits "the court" to allow the thirty-day extension, but the
provision does not specify the courts to which it refers. 38 The supreme
court agreed with the appellate court's holding that the statute applies to
both trial court and appellate court determinations that an expert's report
is inadequate because the legislature did not insert language into the statute that would limit "the court[s]" to which the thirty-day-extension pro39
vision applied.
The dissent in Leland argued that the legislature did not intend the
thirty-day extension to apply at the appellate level, because it would result in protracted litigation that the legislature had intended to curb with
the statutory expert-report requirements. 40 However, the majority concluded that holding otherwise would foreclose the plaintiff's opportunity
to cure expert-report deficiencies, which the legislature clearly intended
to allow at section 74.351(c) of the statute. 4 1 Thus, the supreme court
upheld the appellate court's decision that the trial court could allow the
plaintiff a thirty-day window to correct the report's inadequacies under
42
section 74.351(c) of the statute.
D.

PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY IN STATE DEFAMATION ACTION

In Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed an infamous $33.5 million defamation judg32. Leland, 257 S.W.3d 204.

33. Id. at 205.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 207.
38. Id.; see also TEX. CIv.
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 210.
41. Id. at 208.
42. Id.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 74.351(c).
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ment against a hospital and the physicians who temporarily restricted Dr.
Poliner's privileges during a peer review investigation. 43 Though rejected
by the district court, the Fifth Circuit allowed the federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act's (HCQIA) 44 peer review immunity defense to
bar monetary damages for a defamation claim. 45 Dr. Poliner argued that
the review actions did not qualify for HCQIA immunity because the reviewers were maliciously motivated and driven by financial reasons
rather than by concern for quality patient care. 46 The appellate court
rejected this argument because it found that the reviewers had ample,
objective reasons for the privilege restriction and, thus, the court could
47
not look to subjective reasons under the HCQIA immunity standard.
The court explained that physicians have access to injunctive and declaratory relief, but not monetary relief, if subjected to malicious peer review
actions, and that Congress intended this result because the "system-wide
benefit of robust peer review" outweighs the burdens of these "occa48
sional harsh results."
The court also rejected Dr. Poliner's argument that the reviewers could
not avail themselves of the immunity defense because they had not complied with the peer review provisions of the hospital's medical staff bylaws, which required evidence of a "present danger" to patients before
suspending privileges. 49 The court explained that HCQIA does not require compliance with hospital bylaws to be eligible for the peer review
immunity. 50 In all, the court held that Dr. Poliner failed to rebut the
statutory presumption that the defendants were entitled to HCQIA peer
51
review immunity.
Dr. Poliner submitted a petition to the United States Supreme Court to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision, but the petition was denied on January
21, 2009.52 Hospitals and peer reviewers are now able to breathe a sigh of
relief in Texas, although the tradeoff is that the Poliner opinion leaves
physicians who are subjected to egregious or ill-motivated peer reviews
with injunctive relief as their only available legal remedy, unless the hospital's actions lacked any reasonable and objective basis.
III.

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

In the contract enforcement arena, two courts of appeals provided
opinions that should catch the attention of health care lawyers across the
43. 537 F.3d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009). As unusual

as a $33.5 million judgment is in a peer-review case, that amount was much less than the
jury's award of more than $360 million. Id. at 375.
44.
45.
46.
47.

42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152. (2000).
Poliner, 537 F.3d at 369-70.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 379-80.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 380-81.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009).
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state. In one, the court upheld a jury's damages award to a hospital for a
physician's breach of a recruiting agreement, despite the physician's defense that the hospital also breached the agreement. In the second case,
the court upheld a patient-recruiting contract with a novel interpretation
of the advertising exception to the Texas Patient Solicitation law.
A. No

EXCUSED PERFORMANCE UNDER RECRUITING AGREEMENT

In Hovorka v. Community Health Systems, Inc., the El Paso Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling that a surgeon, Dr. Hovorka,
owed a hospital, Big Bend Regional Medial Center (BBRMC), almost
$200,000 in damages, interest, and attorney's fees for violating the terms
53
of a recruiting agreement.
BBRMC claimed that Dr. Hovorka breached the recruiting agreement
by resigning from BBRMC and moving to another city prior to the end of
the three-year term of the agreement.5 4 In response to BBRMC's breach
of contract claim, Dr. Hovorka asserted the affirmative defense of excused performance for prior material breach. 55 Dr. Hovorka also
56
brought his own breach of contract and fraud claims against BBRMC.
In support of his claims and affirmative defense, Dr. Hovorka specifically
alleged that BBRMC promised, but failed to do the following: (1) maintain accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), (2) maintain Medicare and Medicaid
certifications, (3) provide two million dollars worth of hospital operating
equipment, (4) provide a medical office for Dr. Hovorka, and (5) provide
locum tenens coverage for Dr. Hovorka while he prepared and tested for
57
board certification.
The recruiting agreement explicitly stated that BBRMC would be
JCAHO accredited and Medicare and Medicaid certified, as well as provide locum tenens coverage but it did not include any promises of operating equipment or a medical office. 58 Dr. Hovorka alleged that these
promises were made to him orally around the time of the contract negotiations, but the appeals court held that Dr. Hovorka did not present sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact on these alleged promises
to support a breach of contract claim, fraud claim, or affirmative defense.5 9 On the accreditation and certification issue, BBRMC argued
that those statements in the contract were not material terms because
they were mere "recitals" explaining the nature and context of the agreement. 60 The court of appeals rejected this argument, but still upheld the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

262 S.W.3d 503, 507-08 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509-10.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id.
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lower court's summary judgment in favor of BBRMC on this issue. 6 1 The
court explained that Dr. Hovorka's breach of contract claim and prior
material breach affirmative defenses both failed because Dr. Hovorka did
not present any evidence, other than conclusory statements, of the damages he suffered as a result of BBRMC's breach of these terms of the
agreement. 62 Dr. Hovorka's damages evidence was limited to his unsubstantiated statements that he lost around $104,000 a month because peo63
ple did not want to go to a hospital that was not certified or accredited.
On the fraud claim, the appeals court chose not to disturb the jury's
findings that Dr. Hovorka ratified the alleged misrepresentations about
certification and accreditation when he chose to continue performing
under the agreement after learning that BBRMC was not certified or accredited. 64 The court was not persuaded by Dr. Hovorka's argument that
the jury should have received an additional instruction that ratification
could not have occurred if Dr. Hovorka tried to stop the fraud, as such an
instruction was not supported under the law. 65 Thus, the court ultimately
held BBRMC not liable for fraud or breach of contract and Dr. Hovorka
fully liable for breach of contract because: (1) Dr. Hovorka ratified the
agreement after learning of the alleged fraud and (2) Dr. Hovorka could
not prove the damages element of his breach of contract claim and prior
material breach defense. 66 The court affirmed the lower court's damages
award for contract breach and required Dr. Hovorka to return all monies
to BBRMC that he received while he was working for BBRMC in compliance with the recruiting agreement, in addition to paying interest and
67
attorney's fees.
While the Hovorka opinion appears to allow hospitals wide latitude in
negotiations and performance of recruiting agreements with physicians in
Texas, the court used a novel analytical framework to support its holding
regarding Dr. Hovorka's affirmative defense of excused performance for
prior material breach. The court analyzed Dr. Hovorka's breach of contract claim together with his prior material breach defense and treated
both as having the same elements of proof-including proof that Dr.
68
Hovorka suffered damages as a result of BBRMC's alleged breach.
Surely, Dr. Hovorka was required to prove damages to succeed on his
breach of contract claim to obtain damages from BBRMC, but it is unclear why the court required Dr. Hovorka to prove damages to support
his prior material breach defense for excused performance on BBRMC's
breach of contract claim. In Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co.,
the most recent Texas Supreme Court opinion to discuss prior material
61. Id.
62. Id. at 511-12.
63. Id. at 511.
64. Id. at 513-14.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 511-14.
67. Id. at 507-08.

68. Id. at 508-09.
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breach as an affirmative defense, the court did not require proof of resulting damages to excuse performance. 69 Rather, the supreme court required the pleading party to prove that the other party had breached the
agreement and that the breach was material. 70 In Hovorka, the El Paso
Court of Appeals did not apply a similar independent analysis of Dr.
Hovorka's prior material breach defense. 71 Further, the court in
Hovorka rejected BBRMC's argument that the accreditation and certification provisions of the contract were immaterial terms. 72 Thus, it would
appear that Dr. Hovorka proved his prior material breach defense under
the analytical framework provided by the supreme court in Mustang
Pipeline when Dr. Hovorka presented evidence of the express terms of
the contract requiring BBRMC to maintain the JCAHO accreditation
and Medicare and Medicaid certifications.
The Hovorka opinion supports the argument that a breaching physician
must return all monies received under a recruiting agreement, despite
breaches by the hospital, if the physician cannot prove any damages resulting from the hospital's breach. However, the supreme court opinion
in Mustang Pipeline ought to support an argument that, regardless of the
physician's ability to prove any resulting damages, the physician should
not be liable for all payments received under the agreement if the physician has proven a material breach by the hospital as a defense to contract
enforcement.
B.

CONTRACT NOT ILLEGAL UNDER PATIENT SOLICITATION LAW

The Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in Piano Surgery Center v. New
You Weight Management Center is the first to interpret the current ver-

73
sion of the Texas Patient Solicitation Law. Originally enacted in 1991,74

the Patient Solicitation Law is modeled after the federal anti-kickback
statute, 75 which prohibits the payment or acceptance of remuneration in
return for the referral of medical services or products reimbursable under
69. 134 S.W.3d 195, 198-99 (Tex. 2004).
70. Id.
71. See Hovorka, 262 S.W.3d at 508-12.
72. See id. at 510.
73. 265 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.
§§ 102.001-.011 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (current version of the Texas Patient Solicitation
Law). In New Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 47 S.W.3d 34, 38-39
(Tex. App.-.Texarkana 2001, no pet.), the court of appeals held a contract enforceable
under a prior version of the Patient Solicitation Law that excepted advertising arrangements if payments were "not based on the volume or value of referrals" generated by the
advertising.
74. The Patient Solicitation Law was originally codified in the Health and Safety Code
at sections 161.091 through 161.094 under the "Illegal Remuneration" subchapter but was
re-codified in the Texas Occupations Code at sections 102.001 through 102.011 under the
"Solicitation of Patients" chapter in 1999. Compare Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S. (1991),
with Tex. H.B. 3155, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), and TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.011.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2006); see also Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S.
(1991).
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Medicare or Medicaid. 76 The Texas Patient Solicitation Law is broader
than its federal counterpart in that the former prohibits illegal remuneration to or from any Texas-licensed health practitioner, regardless of
whether the practitioner requests Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement
for the services. 77 Thus, while profit-based incentive payments for
recruiting new clients are common in most industries, the United States
Congress and the Texas Legislature have prohibited this practice in the
78
health care industry through these laws.
The dispute in Plano Surgery Center arose between a laparoscopic gastric banding (lap-band) surgical services advertising and management
company, New You Weight Management Center (New You), and an ambulatory surgical center, Plano Surgery Center (PSC). 79 PSC allegedly
breached an agreement with New You in which New You provided "marketing services" for lap-band procedures performed at PSC, and, in return, PSC paid New You 66.66% of the profits realized by PSC for each
patient New You referred to PSC for the procedure. 80 The "marketing
services" New You provided were: (1) running radio, Internet, and print
advertisements to recruit prospective patients for the procedure; (2)
recruiting and training surgeons to perform the procedure; (3) conducting
informational seminars for prospective patients; (4) collecting medical
and financial information from prospective patients who expressed interest in the procedure; (5) forwarding the prospective patient's information
to a surgeon selected by New You; (6) counseling the patient before and
after the procedure; and (7) counseling for the family during the
procedure. 81
Prior to the termination of the original agreement, attorneys for PSC
and New You met to discuss the legality of the arrangement, but no new
agreement was memorialized in writing. 82 PSC's attorneys later proposed
that, going forward, PSC would pay New You a flat fee for its services
rather than the 66.66% profit fee. 83 However, shortly thereafter, PSC's
director told New You's director that there would be no change in their
payment arrangement. 84 Subsequently, when PSC did not pay the
66.66% profit fee, New You sued PSC for breach of contract and various
76. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (the federal anti-kickback statute), with TEX.

Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-102.011 (the Texas Patient Solicitation Law); see also TEX.
Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (specifying that interpretation of the Patient Solicitation Law

should be consistent with the federal anti-kickback statute and the implementing regulations); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-0138 (1992); Letter Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 93-84
(1993) (interpreting the Texas Patient Solicitation Law in light of the federal anti-kickback
statute and the implementing regulations).
77. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), with TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.001(a).
78. See New Boston, 47 S.W.3d at 38-39; Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-0138; Letter Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 93-84.
79. Piano Surgery Ctr. v. New You Weight Mgmt. Ctr., 265 S.W.3d 496, 498-99 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
80. 1d. at 499-500.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 500.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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other equitable claims. 85 PSC argued that the contract was unenforceable because it was illegal under the Patient Solicitation Law and violated
86
public policy.
The Dallas Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the lower court's holding in favor of New You and rejected PSC's argument that the contract
was unenforceable under the law. 87 The court concluded that the contract could have been legally performed as an "advertising" contract because, as the court interpreted the law, payments for advertising services
are generally excepted under the advertising provision at section 102.004
of the law, so long as the advertising was not deceptive or misleading. 88
Based on this presumption, the court then concluded that New You and
PSC presented conflicting material evidence during the trial. 89 Specifically, PSC presented evidence that New You received prohibited remuneration for soliciting patients under the law, and New You presented
evidence that its services constituted permissible advertising under the
law. 90 The court explained that if the evidence at trial does not conclusively establish a defense, then the defending party must request that the
jury receive an instruction on the defense to avoid waiver on appeal. 9 1
The court held that PSC had waived the illegal contract defense by not
requesting a defense instruction as required, based on the court's conclusion that New You's services could be excepted from the law as permissi92
ble advertising.
The court's analysis neglected to address four key weaknesses in the
presumption that New You's services could be excepted from the law
under the advertising provision at section 102.004. First, it is difficult to
understand how the advertising provision alone could exempt New You's
services and payment arrangement when many of New You's services appear not to be related to advertising at all, such as: (1) training surgeons
to perform the procedure, (2) counseling the patient before and after the
procedure, and (3) counseling the family during the procedure. 93 It was
undisputed that New You provided these services to the patients and received per-patient profit fees from PSC in return for providing these services. 94 However, the court neglected to discuss how these nonadvertising services were permissible under the advertising provision or
any other provision of the law. 95
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 502.
88. Id. at 501-02.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.; TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.004 (Vernon Supp. 2008) ("Section 102.001 does
not prohibit advertising, unless the advertising is: (1) false, misleading, or deceptive; or (2)
not readily subject to verification, if the advertising claims professional superiority or the
performance of a professional service in a superior manner.").
93. See Piano Surgery Ctr., 265 S.W.3d at 499-500.
94. See id. at 500.
95. See id. at 502.
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Second, it is arguable that the court misinterpreted the advertising provision by reading it to be a comprehensive exception for any patient solicitation activity related to advertising so long as the advertising was not
deceptive or misleading. 96 Though the advertising provision could be independently read to have this meaning, it is unlikely that this meaning
was intended by the legislature when the provision is read in the context
of the statute as a whole. Such an interpretation of the advertising provision would essentially defeat the purpose of the law, because it would
permit health care providers to pay for otherwise improper patient solicitation services, so long as the services were accomplished in conjunction
with advertising. For example, according to the court's interpretation of
the advertising provision, the law would prohibit a dermatologist from
paying a nursing home employee for each nursing home resident he could
convince to visit the physician for a mole biopsy, but the law would allow
the same arrangement under the advertising provision if the employee
posted advertising flyers around the nursing home to recruit the residents
for the biopsy. Thus, this advertising "exception," as interpreted by the
court in Piano Surgery Center, would essentially swallow the law.
Further, reading the advertising provision as a comprehensive advertising exception is inconsistent with section 102.007 of the law, which excepts a specific type of suspect advertising arrangement-health care
97
provider advertising through information call centers-from the law.
This type of advertising arrangement is expressly exempted from the law
if the arrangement complies with numerous limitations to reduce the risk
of improper patient solicitation. 98 Such an exception would not be necessary if section 102.004, as interpreted by the court in Piano Surgery
Center, created a comprehensive exception for any advertising-related activities that were not deceptive or misleading.
Finally, the court's broad interpretation of the advertising provision is
inconsistent with the legislative history of the law, as well as the statute,
regulations, and cases interpreting the parallel federal anti-kickback statute on which the law was modeled. The federal anti-kickback regulations
create a safe harbor applicable to advertising contracts, which requires
that the aggregate compensation paid to an advertiser be set in advance
and not be determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or
value of any referrals or business generated by the advertising. 99 The
Ncw You compensation arrangement would not fit within this federal exception, because the 66.66% profit payment was not set in advance and
was directly related to the value of the business that New You's "advertising" activities generated for PSC. 100 Furthermore, Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Services Inc. is a federal case with facts
96. See id. at 501-02.
97.

Compare TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.004 with TEX. OcC. CODE ANN. § 102.007.

98. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.007.
99. 42 C.F.R.

§

1001.952(d)(5) (2006). This safe harbor is not limited to advertising

contracts and applies more generally to any personal services or management contracts.
100. See Piano Surgery Ctr., 265 S.W.3d at 500.
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almost identical to those in Piano Surgery Center in which the court refused to enforce a contract between a medical equipment provider and a
marketing company because the contract was illegal and against public
policy under the federal anti-kickback statute. 10 1 The court in Nursing
Home Consultants, held that the health care marketing contract was unenforceable because it based contract payments on the value of Medicare
business generated by the marketing. 10 2 The key difference between
Piano Surgery Center and Nursing Home Consultants is that the Texas
version of the advertising provision does not include the language of the
federal exception, which expressly prohibits payments based on the value
of referrals generated by the advertising activities. 10 3 Clearly, if the Texas
advertising provision included this language, it is unlikely that the court
in Plano Surgery Center could have held the contract enforceable based
on a plain reading of the law and New You's 66.66% profit fee.
The original 1991 version of the Texas advertising provision included
the exact language of its federal counterpart regarding prohibited payments based on the value of referrals. 10 4 But in 1993, the Texas Legislature amended the law for the stated purpose of strengthening and
broadening the scope of the law, and, incidentally, the language prohibiting payments that take into account the volume or value of referrals was
deleted from the general advertising provision and moved to the nar10 5
rower advertising exception for health care information call centers.
to the general advertising
The legislative history describes this change
10 6
provision as a "nonsubstantive" change.
101. 926 F. Supp. 835, 842-44 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
102. Id.
103. Compare TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.004, with 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5).
104. Compare Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S. (1991) (original codification of the advertising exception stating "[t]his section shall not be construed to prohibit remuneration for
advertising, marketing, or other services that are provided for the purpose of securing or
soliciting patients provided the remuneration is set in advance, is consistent with the fair
market value of the services, and is not based on the volume or value of any patient
referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties."), with 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952(d)(5) (federal Anti-Kickback safe harbor for personal services contracts requiring that "[t]he aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is
set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-length transactions and is not
determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
business otherwise generated between the parties.").
105. See Tex. S.B. 211, 73rd Leg., R.S. (1993); Senate Comm. on Health & Human
Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73rd Leg., R.S., at 1 (1993) ("At the time the current
remuneration law was adopted, allegations involving payment for patient referrals centered on various health-related professions. Since then, a steady stream of new allegations
have arisen involving individuals who are not regulated by state health care agencies and,
as a result, are not subject to the provisions of current law. The allegations have included
probation officers, ministers, school counselors, and private businesses set up to recruit
patients and employee assistance programs .... As enrolled, S.B. 211 expands the authority of the illegal remuneration law and provides penalties for violations of this Act.").
106. Senate Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 210, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., at 9 (1993) ("Redesignates existing Subsection (f), deletes existing Subsections (d)
and (e). Makes nonsubstantive changes."). Both S.B. 210 and S.B. 211 were enacted during the 73rd Legislative Session and contained identical amendments to the Patient Solicitation Law.
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The court in Plano Surgery Center did not discuss this legislative history, but it is unlikely that the legislature intended that this "nonsubstantive" change to the general advertising provision, as part of a set of
amendments aimed at strengthening the law would have the opposite effect of allowing an advertising company to solicit patients for a medical
procedure in return for payments based on the value of the medical business generated by the advertising.
Texas health law practitioners structuring advertising and marketing
contracts for health care services reimbursed by private health insurance
companies are now faced with more questions than answers about the
scope of the Texas Patient Solicitation Law in light of the Plano Surgery
Center opinion, which was based on statutory language that resulted from
amendments aimed at strengthening and broadening the scope of the law.
IV.

GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
A.

DISCOVERY PROTECTIONS WHEN COOPERATING
WITH THE GOVERNMENT

In In re Memorial Hermann Healthcare System, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected an expansive interpretation of the privilege protections outlined in the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act's
civil investigative demand (CID) provisions. 10 7 Memorial Hermann
Healthcare System sought to use the statutory CID privilege protections 10 8 to resist production of documents requested by a private antitrust
plaintiff, Stealth, L.P. 10 9 Memorial Hermann asserted that the requested
documents were protected from disclosure in the private antitrust suit because it had previously produced the documents to the Texas attorney
general pursuant to a CID for possible antitrust violations.1 10 Specifically, Memorial Hermann argued that the statutory privilege was "a
'blanket privilege' under which a defendant may decline to turn over CID
materials unless its opponent can demonstrate 'good cause' for such production."1'11 Memorial Hermann explained that "the Legislature intended to create a statutory privilege in businesses' favor to encourage
' q 12
candid cooperation with a CID.
The court rejected Memorial Hermann's argument based on a plain
reading of the statute. 1 3 The court held that the statutory privilege "precludes the attorney general-but nobody else-from disclosing CID
materials"' 14 and that it "does not extend to CID materials held by the
defendant in private antitrust litigation."' 1 5 The court rejected Memorial
107. 274 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.10(i) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
Memorial, 274 S.W.3d at 197.
110. Id.
109.

111. Id. at 197-98.
112. Id. at 200.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 199.

115. Id. at 197.
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Hermann's argument that the purpose of the privilege was to encourage
candid cooperation during a government investigation because: (1) such
of inforcooperation is required by law, and (2) deliberate withholding
11 6
violation.
criminal
a
is
CID
a
under
requested
mation
While the court's opinion is straightforward and well-reasoned, it neglects to address a key dimension of government investigations and prosecutions. Corporations are encouraged to cooperate with the
government's investigation beyond what is required by law in return for
leniency from the government.1 1 7 By effectively granting private litigants
access to those documents released to the government in the spirit of
cooperation, the court's holding puts defendants in a tenuous position of
balancing the benefits of government leniency with the risks of civil litigation damages. Thus, an unintended consequence of the holding in Memorial Hermann could be a reduction in voluntary cooperation by health
care providers and an increase in government investigation and prosecution costs.
B.

PENALTIES AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR

MEDICAL RECORDS DISPOSAL

In almost identical cases, Texas v. CVS 11 8 and Texas v. Select Medical
Corp.,119 Texas Attorney General Gregg Abbott succeeded in enforcing
Texas' recently enacted identity theft protection laws12 0 against two
health care companies, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and Select Medical Corporation, for discarding sensitive patient medical records and financial information in dumpsters.1 21 In both petitions against the health care
companies, Abbott alleged that the companies violated the laws when
they: (1) failed to safeguard personal identifying information by not
shredding, erasing, or otherwise making the information unreadable or
undecipherable before disposal, (2) failed to implement and maintain
116. Id. at 200.
117. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division's Leniency
Program and Model Leniency Letters (November 19, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.htm ("Through the Division's leniency program, a corporation can
avoid criminal conviction and fines, and individuals can avoid criminal conviction, prison
terms, and fines, by being the first to confess participation in a criminal antitrust violation,
fully cooperating with the Division, and meeting other specified conditions.").
118. 2008 WL 1894881 253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex., Mar. 25, 2008).
119. No. CV-72881, Plaintiff's Original Petition, Texas v. Select Medical Corp. et al.,
No. 08-01-21154 (Hockley Co. Dist. Ct., July 16, 2008) (copy on file with SMU Law
Review).
120. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.48, 48.102, 48.201 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (enacted under Tex. H.B. 698, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) and Tex. S.B. 122, 79th Leg., R.S., at § 2
(2005)). It is important to note these statutes have been repealed and recodified at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 72.004, 521.052, 521.151 effective April 1, 2009, respectively.
Tex. H.B. 2278, 80th Leg., R.S., at 71-74, 267-68, 273-74 (2007).
121. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 3, Texas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV-72881
(253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex. Apr. 16, 2007); Agreed Final Judgment at 1, Texas v.
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV-72881 (253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex. Mar. 25, 2008);
Plaintiff's Original Petition at 5-6, Texas v. Select Medical Corp., No. 08-01-21154 (286th
Dist. Ct., Hockley County, Tex. Jan. 10, 2008); Agreed Final Judgment at 1, Texas v. Select
Medical Corp., No. 08-01-21154 (286th Dist. Ct., Hockley County, Tex. July 16, 2008).
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reasonable procedures to protect and safeguard personal identifying information from unlawful use or disclosure, and (3) failed to destroy or
arrange for the destruction of personal identifying information within its
122
control that it did not retain control over.
Abbott requested injunctive relief to prevent Select Medical and CVS
from committing future acts in violation of the laws, or, alternatively, injunctive relief requiring the companies to contract with a business that
provides document disposal services in compliance with the laws. 123 Abbott also requested that the courts fine the companies $500 in civil penalties per document that was improperly discarded under section 35.48 of
the Business and Commerce Code and $2,000 to $50,000 for each violation under section 48.201 of the code. 124 Ultimately, the Liberty County
District Court ordered CVS to pay the state $315,000 in penalties 125 and
the Hockley County District Court ordered Select Medical to pay
$990,000 in penalties. 126 The courts also enjoined the health care companies from future acts in violation of the laws and required the companies
to implement a detailed compliance program to ensure proper disposal of
127
sensitive patient information in the future.
In the judgments, the courts provided almost identical, lengthy requirements for the health care companies' medical record disposal compliance
programs, 128 and these judgments offer a wealth of information to Texas
health care companies. The medical record disposal compliance programs from the judgments include requirements such as: written documentation of the compliance program, designation of a committed
compliance officer, procedures for initially assessing and periodically
evaluating the company's compliance risks, policies governing employee
retention and evaluation related to program compliance, procedures for
monitoring program implementation and effectiveness, and employee
training on the compliance program, relevant laws, and how to report
program violations. 12 9 To minimize the risk of similar claims and large
fines, health care companies with Texas locations might consider re-evaluating their document disposal compliance programs in light of the minimum program requirements outlined in the CVS and Select Medical
judgments.

122. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 4, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 6-7, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
123. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 4, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 7, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
124. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 5, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 8, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
125. Agreed Final Judgment at 7, CVS, No. CV-72881.
126. Agreed Final Judgment at 11, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
127. Id. at 4-10; Agreed Final Judgment at 3-7, CVS, No. CV-72881.
128. Agreed Final Judgment at 3-7, CVS, No. CV-72881.
129. Id.
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PUBLIC HEALTH AND INDIGENT CARE

Public health and indigent care issues were hot topics this year. The
Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas Health and Human Services
Commission's (HHSC) data-collection method for determining state
Medicaid payment rates to hospitals was an invalidly promulgated rule
under the Texas Administrative Procedures Act (APA). In addition, the
Texas attorney general ruled that a county government could not pay certain health care claims submitted by health care providers because the
claims resulted in unconstitutional local government debt. In another
opinion, the attorney general concluded that implementation of Bexar
County's recently enacted pilot needle-exchange program would likely violate Texas controlled substances laws that prohibit the possession or delivery of drug paraphernalia.
A.

THE AUTHORITY OF INFORMAL MEDICAID

REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

In El Paso Hospital District v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that the HHSC's
data-collection method for determining Medicaid payment rates to hospitals was an invalid rule under the APA. 130 HHSC sets Medicaid payment
rates using a prospective payment system that bases future payment rates
on average costs and claims data from prior years. 13 1 Medicaid statutes
and regulations require HHSC to use claims and cost data from twelvemonth periods that run concurrently with the state government's fiscal
year.' 32 However, HHSC had an internal policy of limiting the annual
claims data to those claims that had been paid within six months of the
133
end of the twelve-month period.
The hospital argued that this policy inappropriately reduced the payment rate by excluding more costly claims from the twelve-month period
because these more costly claims often took longer for HHSC to adjudicate and pay.13 4 The hospital also argued that this policy was invalid because it was not promulgated as an HHSC rule and open to public
comment as required by the APA. 135 In response, HHSC argued that its
policy was not a rule subject to the APA because it was merely an interpretation of a rule. 136 The court agreed with the hospital and held the
policy to be an invalid rule under the APA. 137 The court explained that
the policy fit squarely within the definition of a rule under the APA be130. El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 709,
711 (Tex. 2008). The Texas Administrative Procedure Act is codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. §§ 2001.001-.902 (Vernon 2008).
131. Id. at 712.
132. Id. at 713.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 713, 715.
135. Id. at 713-14.
136. Id. at 714.

137. Id.
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cause it was an agency statement that: (1) affected the interest of the
public at large, (2) implemented law or policy or amended or repealed a
prior rule, and (3) affected a private right or procedure rather than only
the internal management or organization of a state agency. 138 According
to the court, the policy affected the public at large because the prospective payment system and its calculations affect all hospitals receiving reimbursement for inpatient Medicaid services. 139 Further, the policy
effectively amended the prior rule defining how HHSC would calculate
Medicaid payment rates by essentially limiting the claims data that HHSC
would use from the required twelve-month period. 140 Finally, the policy
affected the hospital's private rights, rather than only the internal management of HHSC, because the claims-limiting policy directly affected
the prospective payment-rate formula and the hospital's right to
reimbursement. 141
The supreme court's ruling in favor of the hospital in El Paso Hospital
District gives Texas health care providers more certainty regarding the
authority of novel Medicaid claims and reimbursement requirements
from various guidance documents and manuals published by HHSC and
Medicaid contractors, such as TMHP (Texas Medicaid Healthcare Partnership). Usually, these manuals and resource documents simply reiterate or rephrase Medicaid statutes or regulations. However, these
resources sometimes contain new hurdles or limitations that are not otherwise present in any statutes or regulations. El Paso Hospital District
provides health care providers with a new tool for disputing the validity
of these informal sources of Medicaid rules and requirements in the event
that a requirement infringes on a provider's right to Medicaid
reimbursement.
B.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEBT FOR INDIGENT CARE

Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott recently issued an opinion concluding that the Cameron County Commissioners Court could not direct
the county to pay certain indigent health care claims because the claims
were likely unconstitutional debt. 14 2 Cameron County allocates a certain
percentage of the current year's tax revenues to the payment of indigent
health care services through contracts with health care providers. 143 In
the event that the claims exceed the allocated budget for the year, the
county pays the claims from the general tax revenues of the following
year.' 44 Under the Texas Constitution, city and county governments are
prohibited from incurring any debt without levying a tax to pay the inter138. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(6)(A)-(C)).
139. Id.
140.

Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 714-15.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0652 (2008).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
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est on the obligation and two percent of the principal. 145 Abbott concluded that the payment of the excess claims from future tax revenues
was a county debt and that such debt was unconstitutional because it was
incurred without the required additional tax to pay the interest and principal portion. 14 6 Thus, Abbott stated that the Cameron County Commissioners Court could not order the county to pay these claims because they
were not "just and legal demands" under the Texas Constitution.1 4 7 Abbott also stated that he was not asked to write and was not offering an
opinion on any legal remedies the health care providers may have on the
148
outstanding claims.
Abbott's opinion is interesting in light of the current climate of local
government budget shortfalls, the growing uninsured population, and the
steady rise in health care costs. It is unclear how the Cameron County
health care providers will address this specific payment refusal, but, going
forward, health care providers may need to be more attentive to the revenue sources and allocated budgets of Texas local and county governments
when contracting for health care services payment.
C.

CLEAN NEEDLES PILOT PROGRAM COULD VIOLATE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS

In another attorney general opinion, Abbott concluded that the recently enacted Bexar County pilot needle exchange program (the Pilot
Program) 149 could result in violations of the Texas controlled substances
law, 150 which prohibits the possession or delivery of drug paraphernalia.
The opinion requestor, Senator Jeff Wentworth, argued that the Pilot
Program statute implicitly exempted program participants from prosecution under the controlled substances law because: (1) that was the legislature's intent, and (2) the legislature clearly did not intend to create a
program that was effectively illegal.1 51 Abbott disagreed with Senator
Wentworth's arguments. The attorney general's opinion began by explaining that the statute permitted, but did not require, Bexar County to
implement the Pilot Program. 152 Thus, on its face, the Pilot Program statute was not inconsistent with the controlled substances law prohibiting
the possession or delivery of drug paraphernalia.1 53 Abbott further explained that it must be assumed that the legislature was aware of the law
prohibiting the possession of drug paraphernalia but chose not to include
an express provision exempting the Pilot Program from the law. 154
145. Id. at 2-3 (referencing TEX. CONST. art XI, § 7).

146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 6-7.
148. Id. at 7 n.6.
149. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 531.0972 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
150. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

151.
152.
153.
154.

Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0622 at 3 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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In support of this argument, Abbott discussed numerous, express statu-

tory exceptions to the controlled substances laws that the legislature had
chosen to include in similar public health program statutes in the past. 155
To summarize, Abbott stated, "we must take the statutes as we find them
and allow the Legislature, if it wishes, to remedy any alleged defects. 1 56
Abbott took his argument a step further by providing an itemized list of
numerous other state and federal laws that the Pilot Program could implicate if implemented by Bexar County under the current version of the
statute. 157 Abbott also commented that it would be an issue of
prosecutorial discretion on whether or not Pilot Program participants
158
would be prosecuted under any laws.

Of note, Texas legislators have already filed three bills in the 81st Legislative Session that would exempt state disease control program activities, such as the needle exchange activities of the Pilot Program, from the
drug paraphernalia law at section 481.125 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code. 159 It will be interesting to see if the legislature decides to pass any
of these laws in response to the attorney general's opinion on the legality
of the needle exchange program.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, this Survey period has given attorneys a wide range of new
legal issues and developments to consider when advising Texas health
care clients. In addition to the opinions selected for discussion in this
article, Texas health care attorneys might also be interested in the following cases decided during the survey period that are worth noting: Texas ex
rel Ven-A-Care v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., which resulted in multimil-

lion-dollar settlements with the pharmaceutical manufacturers Abbott
Laboratories and GlaxoSmithKline over allegations that they inflated
Medicaid price reports and overcharged the Texas Medicaid program, 60
Boren v. Texoma Medical Center, holding that a hospital did not have a
duty to warn third parties that a patient might harm his family after the
155. Id. (referring to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.111(c) (Vernon Supp.
2008) ("Similarly, the Legislature has expressly excepted from specified provisions of the
Texas Controlled Substances Act a person who 'possesses or delivers ... drug paraphernalia to be used to introduce tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives into the human body,
for use in a federally approved therapeutic research program."').
156. id.
157. Id. at 7 Examples provided included state felony conspiracy under TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 2008), state felony dispensing of drug paraphernalia to
a minor under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008),
federal criminal drug paraphernalia possession under 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) (2000), and federal criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) Id.
158. Id. at 6-7.
159. Tex. H.B. 272, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2 (2009); Tex. H.B. 142, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2
(2009); Tex. S.B. 188, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2 (2009).
160. Settlement Agreement and Release with Abbott Labs., Texas v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., No. D-1-GV-04-01286 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sep. 8, 2008); Settlement
Agreement and Release with GlaxoSmithKline, Texas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. D-1-GV04-01286 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Oct. 11, 2007).
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hospital refused to admit the patient with self-inflicted wounds and suicidal ideations,'161 and Merck & Co. v. Garza, which partially reversed
and remanded a multimillion-dollar products liability verdict against
Merck alleging that one of its drugs, Vioxx, caused the death of a patient
162
suffering from a heart condition.

161. 258 S.W.3d 224, 225-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
162. 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. filed) (the original opinion
issued on May 14, 2008 was withdrawn and superseded with a Dec. 10, 2008 opinion based
on a rehearing regarding jury misconduct).

